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TORT AS A LITIGATION LOTTERY:  
A MISCONCEIVED METAPHOR 
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Abstract: For over forty years, tort reform proponents have disparaged 
the tort system as a lottery, arguing that it produces arbitrary outcomes. 
This criticism has been offered as justification for reform proposals that 
would replace the tort system with some form of no-fault accident insur-
ance. We do not oppose no-fault alternatives to tort, but this Essay is not 
the place to weigh the merits of one or another such proposal. Our pur-
pose here is the more limited one of discrediting the lottery metaphor as 
applied to the tort system. We make three claims. First, this metaphor ob-
scures the tort system’s shortcomings more than it clarifies them. Second, 
no-fault accident insurance plans fail to resolve the problem of arbitrari-
ness, regardless of how carefully the plan is designed. Third, arbitrariness 
is endemic in compensation systems, which all set coverage limits that 
create horizontal inequities among claimants with similar injuries and re-
duce predictability in the many borderline cases. In light of these three 
points, we maintain that reformers must more carefully compare the na-
ture and sources of arbitrariness in all compensation systems before em-
bracing any particular system. Such analysis, we believe, will discourage 
the kind of oversimplification that the lottery metaphor encourages. 
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[T]he fault system is little more than an immoral lottery for both plaintiffs 
and defendants. 
—Marc A. Franklin1 
The operation of the tort system is akin to a lottery. 
—Jeffrey O’Connell2 
Our current personal injury law system is not a system of justice; it is a lottery. 
—Stephen D. Sugarman3 
[T]he [tort] system is about as fair as a lottery. In fact it is not too much to 
say that it is a lottery, a lottery by law. 
—P.S. Atiyah4 
The nature of a litigation lottery is that the availability of potentially huge 
damages justify [sic] bringing a meritless claim, so long as there is some small 
chance that the combination of an outlier judge and an outlier jury will pro-
duce a jackpot that compensates for the risk that the judge/jury combination 
will get it right. 
—Ted Frank5 
Introduction 
 For over forty years, tort reform proponents have disparaged the 
tort system as a lottery, arguing that it produces arbitrary outcomes.6 
Tort doctrine, they allege, awards compensation and imposes liability 
based on considerations unrelated to what the parties deserve.7 More-
over, they assert, litigation outcomes are determined by adventitious, 
contingent factors—the availability of evidence, the quality of counsel, 
the limits of insurance coverage, the financing of the litigation, the ca-
prices of judges and juries, and many other factors that are not condu-
                                                                                                                      
1 Marc A. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimburse-
ment, 53 Va. L. Rev. 774, 778 (1967). 
2 Jeffrey O’Connell, The Lawsuit Lottery: Only the Lawyers Win 8 (1979). 
3 Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Personal Injury Law: New Compensa-
tion Mechanisms for Victims, Consumers, and Business, at xviii (1989). 
4 P.S. Atiyah, The Damages Lottery 143 (1997). 
5 Ted Frank, Thoughts on the Litigation Lottery, Point of Law, ( July 11, 2005, 6:31 PM), 
http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/001307.php. 
6 See infra notes 15–23 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 15–51 and accompanying text. 
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cive to the consistent application of law.8 The tort system, by this ac-
count, is both unfair and unpredictable. 
 These criticisms have often served as justification for reform pro-
posals that would replace the tort system with some form of no-fault 
accident insurance in order to provide fairer and more reliable com-
pensation to accident victims.9 Under these proposals, negligent con-
duct would be deterred by insurance premiums paid directly into com-
pensation funds by risk creators or public agencies, by subrogation 
actions brought against injurers by insurers seeking reimbursement for 
paid claims, and by criminal sanctions and administrative penalties.10 
 In this Essay, we make three claims intended to discredit the lot-
tery metaphor as applied to the tort system. First, this metaphor ob-
scures the tort system’s shortcomings more than it clarifies them.11 We 
agree, of course, that tort outcomes produce horizontal inequities 
among accident victims with similar injuries, and that outcomes can 
also be unpredictable. Our initial point, however, is that the compari-
son to random selection by lottery both misrepresents how the tort sys-
tem decides cases and exaggerates its unpredictability. 
 Second, no-fault accident insurance plans fail to resolve the prob-
lem of arbitrariness, and this is true regardless of how carefully the plan 
                                                                                                                      
8 See infra notes 15–51 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 10, 52–77 and accompanying text. Although scholars have developed a 
rich variety of proposals to replace tort with no-fault insurance, the thrust of tort reform in 
the last four decades has been less ambitious efforts to tinker with the existing system, par-
ticularly by setting caps on recovery. See Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudence and 
National Tort Reform, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 475, 525–38 (2002) (discussing the relationship 
between tort reform efforts by the states and by the U.S. Congress); Alexandra B. Klass, Tort 
Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1501, 1565–75 (2009) (ana-
lyzing the role of tort law in the federalist system); Ralph Peeples & Catherine T. Harris, 
Learning to Crawl: The Use of Voluntary Caps on Damages in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 54 
Cath. U. L. Rev. 703, 726–42 (2005) (proposing the use of voluntary caps on damages). See 
generally Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, “Off to the Races”: The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Re-
form Process, 27 Hous. L. Rev. 207 (1990) (discussing tort reform efforts during the 1980s in 
the United States, particularly in Texas). Our analysis in this Essay focuses on the use of the 
lottery metaphor as a justification for no-fault insurance, and we argue that no-fault insur-
ance is similarly vulnerable to claims of arbitrariness. Although we do not discuss other forms 
of tort reform here, it is worth noting that damage caps and other related incremental re-
form efforts can also be regarded as arbitrary limitations. See Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on 
Pain and Suffering, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 773, 789–96 (1995). 
10 See, e.g., Atiyah, supra note 4, at 174 (criminal sanctions); Terence G. Ison, The 
Forensic Lottery: A Critique on Tort Liability as a System of Personal Injury 
Compensation 89–94 (1967) (administrative sanctions); O’Connell, supra note 2, at 187 
(subrogation actions); Sugarman, supra note 3, at 160 (administrative sanctions); Frank-
lin, supra note 1, at 781 (criminal and administrative sanctions), 805 (subrogation actions). 
11 See infra notes 27–51 and accompanying text. 
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is designed.12 Such schemes do eliminate the fault requirement, which 
reform proponents blame for creating unfair distinctions between ac-
cident victims with similar injuries and for making outcomes unpre-
dictable. But a no-fault system’s provision that claimants need only 
prove that their injuries are accident related simply reproduces, by 
drawing different boundaries, the very problems of horizontal inequity 
and unpredictability that reform proponents observe and denounce in 
the tort system. 
 Third, arbitrariness is endemic in compensation systems.13 Of ne-
cessity, all compensation schemes set coverage limits that inevitably cre-
ate horizontal inequities among claimants with similar injuries and re-
duce predictability in the many borderline cases. Although addressing 
one kind of arbitrariness, no-fault alternatives create other kinds of ar-
bitrariness, and similarly require making pragmatic tradeoffs that must 
be justified by controversial principles. These structural necessities will 
entail some unpredictability and horizontal inequity. 
 We emphatically do not oppose no-fault alternatives to the tort sys-
tem. The merits of one or another such scheme are not before us in 
this Essay. Quite to the contrary, our point is that reformers must en-
gage in more careful analysis and comparison of the nature and 
sources of arbitrariness in all compensation systems before embracing 
one or another of these systems. Doing so will discourage the kind of 
oversimplification that the lottery metaphor encourages. This oversim-
plification illustrates the cognitive problem with metaphorical thinking 
in legal analysis about which Justice Cardozo cautioned: “Metaphors in 
law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate 
thought, they end often by enslaving it.”14 
I. The Lottery Metaphor’s Two Conceptions of Arbitrariness 
 Those who use the lottery metaphor to disparage the tort system 
contend that the system is arbitrary in two distinct ways. First, they con-
tend, tort doctrine arbitrarily discriminates among similarly situated par-
ties.15 Consider Marc Franklin’s critique: “One is immediately struck by 
the spectacular legal lottery into which the fault system thrusts the plain-
tiff. We may posit several identical victims suffering identically disabling 
injuries, yet one may recover thousands of dollars under the fault rules 
                                                                                                                      
12 See infra notes 15–26 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 27–51 and accompanying text. 
14 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926). 
15 See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 1, at 785–90. 
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while an equally innocent victim may recover nothing.”16 Moreover, 
Franklin continues, “Two defendants who commit identical careless acts 
may find themselves liable for vastly different amounts depending solely 
on the fortuitous nature of the harm that results. This is the defendants’ 
lottery.”17 By this account, tort doctrine inevitably creates horizontal in-
equities among accident victims with similar injuries and among injurers 
who commit similar acts of negligence.18 We agree with Franklin that 
the tort system sometimes discriminates among similarly situated vic-
tims. The question, however, is whether alternative systems also engen-
der horizontal inequities. We maintain that they invariably do; Franklin 
and other users of the tort lottery metaphor elide that question. 
 Reformers assert that tort litigation is also arbitrary in a second 
sense: outcomes are based on chance rather than principle.19 Consider 
Jeffrey O’Connell’s use of the lottery metaphor: 
Most crucial criteria for payment are largely controlled by 
chance: (1) whether one is “lucky” enough to be injured by 
someone whose conduct or product can be proved faulty; (2) 
whether that party’s insurance limits or assets are sufficient to 
promise an award or settlement commensurate with losses and 
expenses; (3) whether one’s own innocence of faulty conduct 
can be proved; and (4) whether one has the good fortune to 
retain a lawyer who can exploit all the variables before an im-
pressionable jury, including graphically portraying whatever 
pain one has suffered.20 
                                                                                                                      
16 Id. at 785. 
17Id. at 790. For a similar view, see Sugarman, supra note 3, at 37, stating that “tort law re-
fuses compensation to many victims who, from the perspective of their need, are as deserving 
as those who succeed through the system.” Franklin asserts that “the lottery charge applies 
equally to strict liability.” Franklin, supra note 1, at 785; see also Ronen Avraham & Issa Kohler-
Hausmann, Accident Law for Egalitarians, 12 Legal Theory 181, 181–224 (2006) (analyzing 
the tension between corrective justice in tort law and an egalitarian commitment to fairness). 
18 See Franklin, supra note 1, at 785–90. 
19 See O’Connell, supra note 2, at 8, 77, 82. 
20 See id. at 8. Although O’Connell characterizes these factors as the products of 
chance, they are analytically distinct. The non-availability of evidence may—for example in 
cases of spoliation—be deliberate and relevant to the fairness of outcome. The quality of 
lawyering is likely to be a function, at least in part, of what parties can afford, making it not 
the product of chance, but rather of a structural bias in favor of those with greater ability 
to pay for legal representation. By contrast, jury composition is, at least in principle, ran-
dom. We argue below in Part II that the lottery metaphor obscures these significant dis-
tinctions in its analysis of the determinants of tort outcomes. 
Atiyah similarly argues that the tort system is a lottery insofar as it is “pure chance 
whether [a person’s injuries] were caused by someone’s fault or not,” and it is “a matter of 
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Jury verdicts, continues O’Connell, are no better than the “flip of a 
coin.”21 Like a game of chance, he contends, “whenever a case goes to a 
jury, the jury can decide the case either way and be right!”22 For him, the 
tort system is an unpredictable “gamble.”23 We consider this claim, and 
the implicit comparison it makes with other compensation systems, at 
greater length in Part II.24 
 For now, it is enough to observe that the tort system might be arbi-
trary in the first sense (i.e., horizontal inequity) but not in the second 
sense (i.e., unpredictability). The system might unfairly discriminate 
among similarly situated parties but do so consistently—that is, in a 
perfectly predictable manner. For example, a consistently applied rule 
that allowed tort recovery only for brown-eyed accident victims would 
be arbitrary in this first sense but not in the second. A system based on 
such a doctrine would be unfair yet highly predictable.25 
 Note also that arbitrariness-as-unpredictability is a subcategory of 
arbitrariness-as-horizontal-inequity. Resolving tort claims on the basis of 
chance circumstances, such as a coin toss, would also arbitrarily dis-
criminate between similarly situated parties. 
 These two types of arbitrariness may also coincide in another way. 
One might believe that tort doctrine relies on considerations, such as 
fault and the extent of damages, that promote horizontal inequity, and 
that chance circumstances that determine litigation outcomes create 
further distortions. By this account, chance circumstances that produce 
unpredictable outcomes exacerbate the tort system’s potential to pro-
duce unfair outcomes due to the application of inappropriate doctrinal 
considerations.26 
                                                                                                                      
sheer luck whether witnesses are available, and therefore whether the cause of the accident 
can be proved.” Atiyah, supra note 4, at 147. 
21 O’Connell, supra note 2, at 77. 
22 Id. at 82. 
23 Id. 
24 See infra notes 27–51 and accompanying text. 
25 What we mean by “predictable” is that, given a set of facts asserted in a claim, one 
can predict the outcome of the claim in the torts process. This is distinguishable from the 
predictability of liability prior to the occurrence of an accident. A brown-eyed victim rule 
would be highly predictable in the first sense (once everyone knows the eye color of the 
victim), but not predictable for potential injurers in the second sense (since the potential 
injurer would not know the chances of injuring a brown-eyed victim). O’Connell and the 
reform advocates who employ the lottery metaphor seem concerned with addressing what 
they see as the post-accident unpredictability of litigation outcomes, not the pre-accident 
unpredictability of liability. See O’Connell, supra note 2, at 8, 77, 82. 
26 See infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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II. The Lottery Metaphor Obscures the Nature,  
and Exaggerates the Extent, of Arbitrariness  
in the Tort System 
 Reformers are right to express serious concerns about horizontal 
inequity among both plaintiffs and defendants within the tort system.27 
Plaintiffs with similar injuries are treated differently on the basis of 
both doctrinal and administrative considerations that are unrelated to 
the nature of their injuries. By the same token, defendants who commit 
similar wrongs are treated differently on the basis of considerations that 
are unrelated to the character and injurious tendency of their actions. 
Reformers are also accurate in noting the variability of outcomes due to 
differences in factors like the availability of evidence, financial differ-
ences, the quality of counsel, and jury composition.28 
 Unfortunately, the lottery metaphor in no way advances under-
standing of these problems. To the contrary, it mischaracterizes and 
exaggerates them. Both a lottery and the tort system discriminate 
among similarly situated participants. A lottery, however, does so en-
tirely on the basis of random selection, whereas the tort system does 
so—both in principle and in practice—on the basis of doctrinal princi-
ples like fault and damages, procedural and evidentiary requirements, 
and less formal “rules of thumb”29 that make tort outcomes considera-
bly more consistent and predictable than a lottery or O’Connell’s coin 
toss.30 By dismissing the role of doctrine, procedural requirements, and 
informal rules that make tort outcomes more consistent and predict-
able than lottery results or coin tosses, the lottery metaphor obscures 
the true nature and extent of arbitrariness in the tort system. 
 According to Franklin, arbitrariness—differential treatment of si-
milarly situated parties—results from attempting to accommodate two 
                                                                                                                      
27 See Sugarman, supra note 3, at 37; Franklin, supra note 1, at 785–90. 
28 See O’Connell, supra note 2, at 8. As we noted above, although factors like these 
contribute to variability of outcomes, they are not all matters of chance. See supra note 20; 
see also David Crump, Evidence, Economics, and Ethics: What Information Should Jurors Be Given 
to Determine the Amount of a Punitive Damage Award?, 57 Md. L. Rev. 174, 183–201, 215–33 
(1998) (presenting an economic model of compensatory and punitive awards); Eric Hel-
land & Alexander Tabarrok, Race, Poverty, and American Tort Awards: Evidence from Three Data 
Sets, 32 J. Legal Stud. 27, 33–53 (2003) (examining how the race and income of jury pool 
members affect tort awards). 
29 See generally H. Laurence Ross, Settled Out of Court: The Social Process of 
Insurance Claims Adjustment 232–43 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing the use of informal 
norms in the processing and settlement of tort claims). 
30 See O’Connell, supra note 2, at 77. 
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competing goals within a single institution.31 Franklin suggests that the 
fault principle, which aims to condemn and deter negligent conduct, 
creates horizontal inequity between accident victims with similar inju-
ries.32 He further suggests that the doctrinal principle that negligence 
liability is based on the extent of the resulting harm, which serves the 
goal of compensating victims, arbitrarily distinguishes between actors 
who commit similar acts of negligence but inflict different amounts of 
harm.33 When we add to compensation and deterrence additional goals 
or constraints—such as administrative costs, procedural and evidentiary 
rules, and the division of labor between judge and jury based on insti-
tutional competence—the effect of such distinctions is multiplied. 
 Nonetheless, the tort process of determining outcomes is funda-
mentally different from that of a lottery. Lotteries, of course, discrimi-
nate between winners and losers without regard to their individual cir-
cumstances or conduct. But these outcomes are based on random 
selection: that is their very nature and purpose. By contrast, what 
Franklin describes in the tort system is a more consistent, predictable 
pattern of discrimination among victims and injurers based on the ap-
plication of principles.34 Tort law treats those injured by wrongful con-
duct as deserving recourse unavailable to those harmed either by “acts 
of God” or an “innocent” human actor.35 Moreover, in contrast with 
criminal sanctions, which generally focus on intent and conduct per se, 
tort links the injurer’s responsibility to the damage caused.36 One can 
plausibly object to both of these rules, but not on the ground that they 
produce random outcomes. 
 The kind of arbitrariness that Franklin describes gives losers in tort 
cases grounds to challenge outcomes as unfair.37 Those denied com-
pensation can point to the unfairness of compensating others with simi-
lar injuries. Moreover, they can also claim that the doctrinal rules were 
wrongly applied.38 Lottery losers have no such grounds for complaint— 
                                                                                                                      
31 See Franklin, supra note 1, at 790. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. Although distinctions between negligent actors on the basis of the harms they 
cause may be arbitrary from the point of view of what they “deserve,” such distinctions are 
not arbitrary from the point of view of an efficiency theory of tort law, which sees the func-
tion of liability as internalizing costs in order to promote optimal risk reduction. See id. at 
785--90. 
34 See id. at 785, 790. 
35 See id. at 785. 
36 See id. at 790. 
37 See Franklin, supra note 1, at 785, 790. 
38 See O’Connell, supra note 2, at 8, 77, 82. 
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indeed, lottery outcomes must be randomly generated in order to be 
fair. Thus, the tort system’s arbitrariness, highlighted by Franklin’s cri-
tique, results from the more or less consistent (i.e., non-random) appli-
cation of doctrinal rules that can be criticized as unfair, whereas a lot-
tery’s arbitrariness is random and thus fair.39 
 O’Connell’s assertion that tort outcomes, like lottery results, are 
based on chance rather than principle obscures a fundamental differ-
ence between the unpredictability of tort and lottery outcomes. At the 
same time, he exaggerates the former. According to O’Connell, recov-
ery in tort depends upon contingent circumstances such as whether the 
plaintiff’s injury was caused by a negligent actor and whether the de-
fendant is capable of satisfying a judgment.40 Similarly, winning a lot-
tery depends on chance circumstances such as whether an entrant was 
able to purchase a ticket that day. This comparison, however, ignores an 
important difference. In the tort system, these chance circumstances 
provide the factual basis for determining the outcome of a claim. 
Judges and juries adjudicate claims by applying a system of doctrinal 
rules to these facts, and attorneys settle claims by applying less formal 
rules of thumb to the facts.41 By contrast, in a lottery, chance circum-
stances determine only eligibility to participate in the lottery. The lot-
tery then selects at random among eligible participants. Once eligibility 
to participate in the lottery is settled, chance circumstances that deter-
mine an individual’s eligibility play no further role within the process of 
random selection. At the decision-making stage, the tort system in prin-
ciple and often in practice is based on judgments about how rules apply 
to facts, quite unlike the process of random selection in lotteries. 
 We harbor no illusions that the tort system is perfectly consistent 
and predictable. Far from it. Judgments about how to interpret rules or 
how rules apply to facts will often vary among individuals for many rea-
sons, including ambiguity in the rules, facts that are incomplete or can 
be interpreted in various ways, differences in expertise or access to wit-
nesses, and cultural or ideological diversity among judges and juries.42 
We recognize also that factors highlighted by critics of the tort system— 
                                                                                                                      
39 We say “more or less” consistent application of doctrinal rules in recognition of ir-
reducible uncertainties in application. 
40 See O’Connell, supra note 2, at 8. 
41 See Ross, supra note 29, at 239; Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitabil-
ity of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 
1571, 1589, 1627–28 (2004). 
42 See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About 
Health, Wealth, and Happiness 211–12 (2008) (suggesting that the variability in pain 
and suffering and punitive damage awards makes the tort system like a lottery). 
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the availability of evidence, the limits of insurance coverage, the quality 
of counsel, and jury composition—exacerbate variability.43 Neverthe-
less, the outcome variability produced by such factors does not equate 
the tort process to random selection by lottery. There is evidence that, 
despite this variability, “[c]ourt awards are a highly predictable process” 
and “attorneys . . . seem to be able to substantially anticipate how courts 
dispense those awards.”44 
 Some critics suggest that this general predictability notwithstand-
ing, the tort system produces random errors that result in large lottery-
like payouts to fraudulent claimants.45 Ted Frank claims that 
[t]he nature of a litigation lottery is that the availability of po-
tentially huge damages justify [sic] bringing a meritless claim, 
so long as there is some small chance that the combination of 
an outlier judge and an outlier jury will produce a jackpot 
that compensates for the risk that the judge/jury combination 
will get it right.46 
 Outlier decisions do not make tort litigation a lottery, however. 
The possibility that a judge will misapply the law or a jury will miscon-
strue the facts is not even remotely like random selection in a lottery. It 
makes no sense to argue that a lottery winner should not have won. By 
contrast, one can coherently characterize litigation outcomes as erro-
neous because litigation outcomes, unlike a lottery, are determined by 
judgments about rules and facts, and most of the litigation rules are 
                                                                                                                      
43 See O’Connell, supra note 2, at 8. 
44 Evan Osborne, Courts as Casinos? An Empirical Investigation of Randomness and Efficiency 
in Civil Litigation, 28 J. Legal Stud. 187, 203 (1999); see also Stephen Daniels & Joanne 
Martin, Civil Juries and the Politics of Reform 238 (1995) (analyzing orderly patterns 
that account for variation in jury awards); Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Puni-
tive Damages, 26 J. Legal Stud. 623, 633–37 (1997) (finding that juries only rarely award 
punitive damages and seem most reluctant to do so in products liability and medical mal-
practice cases); Neil Vidmar & Mirya R. Holman, The Frequency, Predictability, and Proportional-
ity of Jury Awards of Punitive Damages in State Courts: A New Audit, 43 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 855, 
869–72 (2010) (presenting data that suggest case-type patterns in jury awards of punitive 
damages); Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical 
Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 883, 897 (1993) (find-
ing that juries provided more stable estimates of noneconomic damages in medical malprac-
tice cases than would be obtained from a single arbitrator or judge). 
45 See, e.g., David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical 
Malpractice Litigation, 354 New Eng. J. Med. 2024, 2025, 2029 (2006); Frank, supra note 5. 
46 Frank, supra note 5. 
2011] Tort as a Litigation Lottery 277 
designed—not exclusively but in large part—to increase accuracy.47 In-
deed, this is the rationale for an appellate process, which would play no 
re-evaluative role in a lottery system. 
 Moreover, suggesting that a decision procedure’s error rate makes 
it a lottery is a category mistake: the very possibility of identifying an 
outcome as erroneous logically renders the procedure non-random 
and, therefore, not a lottery. To be sure, the error rate of a decision 
procedure could be so high as to render outcomes so unpredictable 
and unsystematic that they would seem random. But tort critics offer no 
persuasive evidence that high damage awards based on erroneous find-
ings of liability are anything but statistical outliers. 
 One might argue that there is randomness in whether an individ-
ual who files a spurious tort claim will be lucky enough to draw the rare 
judge or jury who will produce an erroneous judgment in his or her 
favor.48 But a random distribution of errors does not make a flawed 
process into a random one. Although bank depositors stand a random 
chance of an accounting error in their favor, this randomness does not 
make depositing one’s money in a bank tantamount to playing a lot-
tery. Even though errors in the banking system may be randomly dis-
tributed, they are rare enough that depositors do not consider the sys-
tem either unpredictable or unreliable. Similarly, as long as they are 
relatively rare, random errors do not make the tort system a lottery. 
 Of course, at some point, all of the factors that contribute to the 
variability in tort outcomes and the frequency of errors could be so in-
fluential that, taken together, they would create sufficient arbitrariness 
to render the tort system tantamount to a lottery. Our argument is 
premised on the belief that the system is far from reaching this point. 
But we concede that this is, to a considerable extent, a matter of judg-
ment. In addition to our arguments concerning the predictability of 
tort outcomes, our judgment relies on the fact that hard-eyed parties, 
                                                                                                                      
47 Some litigation rules reduce accuracy but promote other values. For example, the 
marital confidences privilege may prevent disclosure of information relevant to the adjudi-
cation of a tort claim in order to protect marital privacy. 
48 Note that the distribution of erroneous outcomes is not really random since it pre-
dictably varies with the impartiality of the judge and jury. Variability due to bias is a prob-
lem that should be minimized, consistent with other goals and constraints, but it is not 
random. For an example of recent attempts to address this problem by restricting forum 
shopping, see H.R. 1603, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009), an Oklahoma bill allowing 
courts to move cases that are more properly heard somewhere else in the state, thus re-
stricting forum shopping; H.R. 755, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005), a Texas bill giving 
trial court judges discretion to dismiss lawsuits with little or no connection to Texas; and 
H.R. 13, 2004 Leg., 1st Extraordinary Sess. (Miss. 2004), a Mississippi bill instituting nu-
merous venue reforms to prevent forum shopping. 
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their lawyers, and liability insurers bet huge amounts of money on the 
assumption that the system is more or less predictable.49 
 Critics of the tort system invoke the lottery metaphor to suggest 
that tort is arbitrary in ways that justify replacing it with alternative 
compensation schemes and administrative penalties for deterrence 
purposes.50 So far, we have argued that the lottery metaphor obscures 
the nature of arbitrariness in the tort system and exaggerates its unpre-
dictability. That being so, the metaphor is primarily a rhetorical strategy 
aimed at undermining public confidence in the tort system in order to 
strengthen popular support for various reforms.51 Such rhetoric does 
not advance careful analysis of tort reform. Nor does it illuminate 
whether alternative systems of compensation and deterrence would 
invariably address these concerns in a satisfactory fashion. The Part that 
follows addresses this latter question. 
III. No-Fault Insurance and Administrative Alternatives to the 
Tort System Do Not Eliminate Arbitrariness 
 The lottery metaphor aside, a legitimate concern about arbitrari-
ness in tort outcomes remains. Many reform advocates have long pro-
posed replacing tort liability with no-fault accident insurance combined 
with a system of risk-related premiums, assignability of tort claims to 
insurers, and administrative penalties to deter negligent conduct.52 Ar-
guably, replacing tort liability with no-fault accident insurance would 
both compensate more victims and reduce administrative costs.53 Al-
                                                                                                                      
49 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
50 See supra notes 1–5, 17–25 and accompanying text. 
51 For extended analysis of the rhetorical strategies of tort reform efforts, see Daniels & 
Martin, supra note 44, at 15–26, 94–114, 200–13, and William Haltom & Michael 
McCann, Distorting the Law: Politics, Media, and the Litigation Crisis 147–81 
(2004). 
52 See, e.g., Atiyah, supra note 4, at 174 (criminal sanctions); Ison, supra note 10, at 
89–94 (administrative sanctions); O’Connell, supra note 2, at 187 (assignability of tort 
claims to insurers); Sugarman, supra note 3, at 160 (administrative sanctions); Franklin, 
supra note 1, at 781 (criminal and administrative sanctions), 803 (risk-related premiums); 
id. at 805 (assignability of tort claims to insurers). 
53 See O’Connell, supra note 2, at 160–61. The administrative efficiency of alternative 
compensation systems varies widely. See Div. of Fed. Emps.’ Comp., Federal Employees’ Com-
pensation Act, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dfec/regs/compliance/ 
fecafact.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2010) (noting that four percent of workers’ compensa-
tion benefits are applied to overhead administrative costs); Jason Furman, Ctr. on Budget 
and Policy Priorities, Top Ten Facts on Social Security’s 70th Anniversary 5 (2005), 
available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/PolicyBasics_SocSec-TopTen.pdf (noting that Social 
Security administrative costs accounted for 0.6% of total retirement and survivors benefit 
payments in 2005); 2007 Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs Ann. Rep. 7, available at 
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though these gains might justify replacing tort liability with one or an-
other no-fault insurance alternative, this type of reform cannot elimi-
nate all arbitrariness.54 
 Franklin, a leading no-fault proponent, argues that first-party no-
fault accident insurance would eliminate the arbitrariness of fault-based 
tort liability.55 In replacing the tort system, explains Franklin, “[t]he 
focus should be upon the victims of disabling accidents, and upon pro-
viding similar treatment for similarly situated persons suffering similar 
injuries.”56 Whereas the fault system treats accident victims with similar 
injuries differently based on whether or not the injury was negligently 
caused, reformers argue that first-party no-fault accident insurance 
would treat them similarly, promoting horizontal equity among injury 
victims.57 
 In fact, first-party no-fault accident insurance also fails to treat like 
victims alike: it simply creates different boundary issues than tort.58 Un-
der first-party no-fault accident insurance, only individuals whose harm 
was caused by accidents would receive compensation.59 That is, individu-
als suffering identical harms fare differently depending upon what 
caused their harm. A person who loses a leg in an accident receives 
compensation, but a diabetic whose leg is surgically amputated does not. 
Similarly, a person who suffers brain injury as a result of an accident 
would be compensated, but a person afflicted with Alzheimer’s disease 
would not. The requirement of accidental injury would, in Franklin’s 
terms, discriminate between individuals with similar injuries—a manifest 
failure to treat like cases alike.60 
                                                                                                                      
http://www.dol.gov/owcp/07owcpmx.pdf (noting that, in 2007, Federal Employee Com-
pensation Act administrative expenditures were $154.9 million: $144.1 million, or 5.3% of 
total program costs, went to compensation and benefit payouts via the Office of Workers' 
Compensation Programs); see also James M. Anderson et al., The U.S. Experience with 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance: A Retrospective 63, 131 (2010) (prepared by the 
RAND Institute for Civil Justice). 
54 As indicated earlier, the focus of tort reform in the past four decades has been in-
cremental reforms, such as damage caps, which are also subject to charges of arbitrariness. 
See Geistfeld, supra note 9, at 789–96. 
55 Franklin, supra note 1, at 795–98. 
56 Id. at 795. 
57 See O’Connell, supra note 2, at 181–83, 187–205; Sugarman, supra note 3, at 103–
10; Franklin, supra note 1, at 795. 
58 See O’Connell, supra note 2, at 181–82; Franklin, supra note 1, at 777. 
59 See O’Connell, supra note 2, at 181–82; Franklin, supra note 1, at 777. 
60 See Franklin, supra note 1, at 785–90. Franklin was aware of this problem with regard 
to auto accident no-fault plans. See id. at 777. Sugarman, who discusses Franklin’s ideas, 
also emphasizes that “[v]ictim need is independent of cause or type of injury.” Sugarman, 
supra note 3, at 110–13. 
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 A no-fault proponent might deny that first-party no-fault accident 
insurance arbitrarily discriminates between similarly situated individu-
als. Such a proponent might argue, for example, that the goal of such a 
system is to compensate accident victims and that benefit-eligibility 
principles, which distinguish accident victims from those who incur 
similar harms (but from different causes), are entirely consistent with 
this goal. This putative response, however, is merely a tautology. With 
equal logic, one could simply define the tort system’s goal as compen-
sating victims of negligence and then insist that the fault requirement is 
entirely consistent with this goal, so that individuals with identical inju-
ries—one caused by negligent conduct and the other not—are not si-
milarly situated in terms of that goal. 
 Of course, there are good reasons to limit no-fault insurance pro-
posals to accident victims—for example, limited resources or special so-
licitude for those who have been injured by other people rather than by 
natural forces or illness. But these reasons nonetheless determine win-
ners and losers arbitrarily, in Franklin’s sense of the term, by treating 
differently individuals who have similar injuries.61 Moreover, no-fault 
schemes, in practice, are arbitrary in another important respect. Com-
mon features of no-fault schemes—such as ceilings on recovery for lost 
income, scheduled recovery for physical injuries and permanent partial 
disabilities, and elimination of non-economic loss recovery—subject all 
victims to identical recovery limits even where they suffer different 
losses.62 None of this means that extending compensation to all victims 
of accidental injury on a no-fault basis is undesirable. Rather, our point 
is that a concern about arbitrariness in the tort system is not by itself a 
sufficient reason for such reform: no-fault insurance alternatives to the 
tort system also introduce arbitrariness, but now in the form of coverage 
limitations. 
 Beyond the arbitrariness associated with boundary issues and ceil-
ings or exclusions on recovery, internal characteristics of the schemes 
create the potential for uncertainty of coverage.63 For example, workers’ 
compensation claims require not only a determination of whether an 
injury is job related, but also an assessment of the extent of worker im-
                                                                                                                      
61 See Franklin, supra note 1, at 777–78. 
62 See, e.g., N.Y. Insurance Law §§ 1502–1504 (McKinney 2009); N.Y. Workers’ Com-
pensation Law § 15 (McKinney 2010). 
63 See infra notes 64–69 and accompanying text. 
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pairment and disability.64 These issues are particularly difficult to resolve 
in claims involving intangible harm (such as mental stress and toxic ex-
posure) as well as in determinations of permanent partial disability.65 
New Zealand’s no-fault accident compensation scheme similarly requires 
determining whether a claim falls into a category of compensable 
harms—for example, whether a health condition is sufficiently related to 
medical treatment rather than merely the product of illness—and assess-
ing the extent of an accident victim’s inability to work and lost earn-
ings.66 In both systems, coverage limits and loss assessment guidelines 
tend to be general and difficult to apply.67 Moreover, factual disputes and 
conflicting evidence add to the unpredictability of outcomes in workers’ 
compensation claims and in New Zealand’s no-fault scheme.68 Thus, a 
shift from tort to no-fault insurance eliminates neither arbitrariness nor 
unpredictability, but merely relocates the source of these problems from 
                                                                                                                      
64 See Evangelos M. Falaris et al., Causes of Litigation in Workers’ Compensa-
tion 11–12 (1995); Leslie I. Boden & Richard A. Victor, Models for Reducing Workers’ Com-
pensation Litigation, 61 J. Risk & Ins. 458, 460 (1994). 
65 See Sugarman, supra note 3, at 131–32 (discussing the difficulty of evaluating work-
ers’ compensation claims for permanent partial disability). 
66 See Peter H. Schuck, Tort Reform, Kiwi-Style, 27 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 187, 197–98 
(2008) (noting the difficulty of assessing a victim’s inability to work and lost earnings); id. 
at 199 (noting the difficulty of determining causation in medical injury claims). 
67 Falaris et al., supra note 64, at 12–13; Boden & Victor, supra note 64, at 460. For 
example, in many jurisdictions, statutes and regulations do not provide clear guidance 
about how to assess permanent impairment and disability. Falaris et al., supra note 64, at 
12–13; Boden & Victor, supra note 64, at 460; Schuck, supra note 66, at 197. Moreover, 
changes in statutes and regulations governing workers’ compensation that affect that 
scope of coverage and the level of benefits create professional uncertainty among attor-
neys and judges, which is an additional source of unpredictability that is more frequent in 
workers’ compensation than in tort. Telephone Interview with Les Boden, Professor of 
Envtl. Health, Bos. Univ. ( Jan. 12, 2010) (notes on file with author). 
68 See Schuck, supra note 66, at 191–96. We have focused here on workers’ compensa-
tion and the New Zealand no-fault accident compensation scheme because they seem most 
closely analogous to the type of no-fault accident insurance that O’Connell has in mind. 
See O’Connell, supra note 2, at 157–75. O’Connell himself relies on workers’ compensa-
tion to argue that no-fault accident insurance is likely to reduce unpredictability. See id. at 
191–93. O’Connell also relies on no-fault auto insurance. See id. at 157–75, 181–82, 191–92. 
Although he surveys evidence that no-fault auto insurance expands coverage and reduces 
administrative costs, he does not offer any evidence that outcomes are more predictable 
than in tort. See id. at 157–75. Moreover, modified no-fault laws make no-fault insurance an 
exclusive remedy only for a subset of auto-related injuries. See id. Thresholds beyond which 
a victim is exempted from mandatory no-fault and can file a lawsuit are defined in general 
terms such as “serious injury” or dollar amounts. See id. at 163–64. These thresholds create 
unpredictability in terms of coverage and valuation just as they do in tort, workers’ com-
pensation, and the New Zealand scheme. See id. 
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fault and the measure of non-economic damages to coverage and the 
assessment of impairment and disability.69 
 Products liability and medical malpractice—areas that critics of the 
tort system have singled out as especially in need of reform—illustrate 
other sources of unpredictability in the administration of no-fault 
schemes.70 No-fault compensation for product-related injuries requires 
a determination of the role of victim contribution—for example, 
whether an individual who falls off a bicycle or a ladder suffered injury 
“arising out of” the product and is thus eligible for compensation. No-
fault compensation for medical injury, as referred to in the New Zea-
land example, sometimes requires a determination of the contribution 
of preexisting conditions to an injury and the compensability of post-
treatment distress where medical treatment produces results short of a 
perfect cure.71 In contested cases with limited evidence, adjudication of 
these issues can make outcomes unpredictable. 
 Of course, no-fault accident insurance might nevertheless be more 
predictable than tort in certain respects, such as risk manageability. 
O’Connell seems to imply that litigation makes tort outcomes unpre-
dictable and that no-fault accident insurance would make compensation 
more predictable by reducing litigation.72 Litigation rates, however, are 
not an indicator of unpredictability.73 As noted earlier, some researchers 
                                                                                                                      
69 See O’Connell, supra note 2, at 181–82 (noting the persistence of these types of un-
certainty in no-fault insurance alternatives to tort for medical injury and product injury). 
One might argue in defense of O’Connell that at least his proposal to replace tort with 
first-party no-fault accident insurance eliminates the unpredictability in the tort system created 
by compensation for pain and suffering and other non-pecuniary losses. O’Connell’s proposal 
for first-party no-fault accident insurance removes this source of unpredictability by simply 
eliminating recovery for non-economic loss. But one need not abandon tort liability to ac-
complish this. If one were interested in greater predictability, recovery for non-pecuniary 
losses could be based on a fixed schedule. 
70 See id. at 180–82; Studdert et al., supra note 45, at 2024, 2032. See generally Kristie 
Tappan, Note, Medical-Malpractice Reform: Is Enterprise Liability or No-Fault a Better Reform?, 46 
B.C. L. Rev. 1095 (2005). 
71 See Schuck, supra note 66, at 199. 
72 See O’Connell, supra note 2, at 160, 172. Although comparing the litigation rates of 
tort and workers’ compensation claims would be complicated, we do know that workers’ 
compensation claims give rise to a great deal of litigation. See Falaris et al., supra note 64, 
at 4 (noting that, in 1990, almost half of all workers’ compensation indemnity claims in 
California were litigated). Litigation rates for cases involving permanent partial disability 
can be even higher. See Boden & Victor, supra note 64, at 459. A proper comparison would 
compare the rates of litigation for tort and workers’ compensation claims involving similar 
injuries or amount of claim. 
73 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
2011] Tort as a Litigation Lottery 283 
find that court awards in tort cases are in fact highly predictable.74 In 
addition, it bears emphasis that tort is not synonymous with litigation. 
The overwhelming majority of tort claims settle prior to trial and are 
frequently resolved on the basis of predictable rules of thumb.75 More-
over, these considerations stand apart from the filtering out of potential 
claims that are never brought, which may also reflect predictability in 
the system.76 Finally, the predictability of litigation outcomes, both ver-
dicts and settlements, in fact varies among different categories of tort 
claims and is a salient factor in drawing any reliable conclusions about 
the comparative predictability of tort and no-fault alternatives.77 
 In sum, no-fault initiatives do not eliminate the need to draw dis-
tinctions that treat individuals with similar needs differently, and they 
require difficult, sometimes unpredictable assessments of causation, 
impairment, and disability. Although no-fault alternatives offer advan-
tages over tort in terms of expanded coverage and lower administrative 
costs, they do not put to rest concerns about horizontal equity and un-
predictability. 
                                                                                                                      
74 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Similarly, litigation rates in workers’ com-
pensation—which are significant in many jurisdictions—are not an indication of uncer-
tainty. See Boden & Victor, supra note 64, at 160–62. A study of workers’ compensation 
claims found that workers’ compensation litigation outcomes are highly predictable in 
some jurisdictions. Id. This is because adjudicators regularly “split the difference” between 
the parties’ assessments of worker impairment. Id. The lack of clear guidance in state 
workers’ compensation regulations about how to assess permanent impairment leads par-
ties to obtain expert medical opinions that maximize or minimize the claim and then pur-
sue litigation in order to obtain a judgment that, predictably, splits the difference between 
the parties. Id. Pursuing litigation thus makes outcomes more predictable. See id. 
75 See Ross, supra note 29, at 3–5, 239; Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 41, at 1589, 1627–28. 
76See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Ad-
versary Culture, 15 Law & Soc’y Rev. 525, 544 (1980–81) (describing the resolution of most 
tort grievances prior to filing a lawsuit). 
77 See Bureau of Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large 
Counties, 2001, at 4 (2005), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ttvlc01. 
pdf (examining tort verdicts in general jurisdiction courts in the 75 largest counties of the 
United States during 2001 and finding the median verdict in medical malpractice cases to be 
$422,000 compared to the median verdict for automobile cases of $16,000). Tort outcomes 
can also vary within the same tort category. See Studdert et al., supra note 45, at 2024 (finding, 
in an examination of 1452 medical malpractice claims, that for claims in which there was no 
medical error, payments averaged significantly less ($313,205), compared to claims where 
errors occurred ($521,560)). Although we are unaware of any comparable data regarding 
settlements, there is reason to believe that settlements vary no more, and perhaps less, than 
verdicts. Tort settlements are generally negotiated “in the shadow of the law,” at arm’s length 
between knowledgeable lawyers familiar with the facts of the case and the applicable legal 
principles. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 968–69 (1979) (discussing how settlement of divorce 
claims are influenced by the substantive legal doctrines that would apply were the claims to 
go to trial). 
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 In addition to no-fault accident insurance, reform advocates pro-
pose administrative penalties for negligent conduct as an alternative to 
tort liability.78 Stephen Sugarman argues that tort liability is frequently 
unnecessary to deter unreasonably dangerous conduct, which is sub-
stantially discouraged by a combination of “[s]elf-preservation instincts, 
market forces, personal morality, and governmental regulation (crimi-
nal and administrative).”79 As part of his plan to do away with personal 
injury law, Sugarman proposes greater reliance on administrative agen-
cies, like the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate risk.80 He also proposes 
reforms that would allow for greater citizen participation in prompting 
investigations and compelling agency action.81 
 Sugarman argues that agencies are better equipped than courts to 
regulate risk from a variety of perspectives.82 Whereas courts merely 
respond to whatever cases come before them, agencies can set their 
own risk management priorities.83 In addition, agencies, unlike courts, 
have powers to investigate risks and the expertise to evaluate the trade-
offs of different risk management strategies.84 And finally, whereas 
courts are limited to awarding damages and granting injunctions (rare-
ly in tort), agencies have a wider array of risk management tools, such 
as recalls and the power to impose civil penalties.85 
 Although there is merit in Sugarman’s analysis, administrative risk 
regulation, whatever its advantages over tort, would not eliminate arbi-
trariness. To begin with, limited resources lead administrative agencies 
to be selective in monitoring and enforcement: because of limited re-
sources for inspection and enforcement, each year federal agencies like 
the CPSC, OSHA, and EPA inspect only a fraction of the regulated enti-
                                                                                                                      
78 See, e.g., Ison, supra note 10, at 89–94; Sugarman, supra note 3, at 160; Franklin, su-
pra note 1, at 781. 
79 Sugarman, supra note 3, at 4–6. Unlike Franklin and O’Connell, Sugarman is not 
proposing a no-fault accident plan, but rather a broader first-party social insurance cover-
age for injury and disease irrespective of source and type of harm. See id. at 161–62. 
80 Id. at 154–60. 
81 Id. at 159–60. 
82 Id. at 156–59. 
83 Id. at 154–60. 
84 See id. 
85 Sugarman, supra note 3, at 156–59. For additional analysis of the comparative ad-
vantages of administrative regulation as a regulatory tool over tort litigation, see Robert 
A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law 126–55 (2001); Peter H. 
Schuck, The Limits of Law: Essays on Democratic Governance 363–73 (2000); W. Kip 
Viscusi, Overview, in Regulation Through Litigation 1, 1–20 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002). 
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ties under their jurisdiction and sanction only a small proportion of the 
violations they are charged with policing.86 This type of selective en-
forcement—particularly when it is minimal and/or unsystematic—treats 
similarly situated wrongdoers differently and makes it difficult to predict 
whether wrongdoing will be penalized. 
 There are other important sources of arbitrariness in administra-
tive risk regulation as well. The influence of certain regulated entities 
over agencies may lead to arbitrary differences in penalizing negligent 
behavior based on political considerations.87 Critics of the regulatory 
system have also argued that professional risk regulators in administra-
tive agencies often simplify risk in terms of expected mortality and 
morbidity, ignoring features of risk that resist quantification but that 
are important to lay people when they assess risk—considerations such 
as the voluntariness, latency, distribution, irreversibility, origin, and 
concentration of risk.88 This simplification leads professional risk regu-
lators to value risk differently than lay people.89 Administrative risk reg-
ulation tends to favor professional valuation of risk, whereas tort regu-
lation allows lay people—injury victims—to price risk in their decisions 
to file claims, settle, or litigate to final judgment. Although there may 
be reasons to prefer administrative risk regulation, the tendency of risk 
regulators to ignore hard-to-assess features of risk can appear arbitrary, 
                                                                                                                      
86 See Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Limited Knowledge of 
the Universe of Regulated Entities Impedes EPA’s Ability to Demonstrate Changes 
in Regulatory Compliance 11 (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2005/ 
20050919-2005-P-00024.pdf (explaining that the EPA’s “monitoring activities focus on major 
and large entities or sources, which represent only a small fraction of the total universe”); 
U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-04-378, Workplace Safety and Health: OSHA’s 
Voluntary Compliance Strategies Show Promising Results, but Should Be Fully 
Evaluated Before They Are Expanded 1 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new. 
items/d04378.pdf (“OSHA can only inspect a small fraction of all worksites each year.”); U.S. 
Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-803, Consumer Safety: Better Information 
and Planning Would Strengthen CPSC’s Oversight of Imported Products 22–23 
(2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09803.pdf (finding that the agency’s 
“ability to inspect shipments for potential violations at ports of entry is limited”). For clarifi-
cation, the U.S. General Accounting Office is now called the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office. The name was changed on July 7, 2004. Our Name, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Of-
fice, http://www.gao.gov/about/namechange.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2010). 
87 See Kenneth J. Meier, Regulation: Politics, Bureaucracy, and Economics 9–36 
(1985) (providing a general introduction to the relationship between agencies and regu-
lated entities). 
88 See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1027, 1071–78 (1990). 
89 Id.; see also Cass Sunstein, Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and the Environment, 
53–77 (2002) (discussing the difference between popular and expert risk evaluation). 
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as critics of cost-benefit analysis have long maintained.90 Thus, neither 
no-fault insurance nor administrative sanction alternatives to the tort 
system eliminate the problem of arbitrariness. 
Conclusion 
 All compensation systems have restrictive categories that engender 
arbitrariness that cannot be eliminated by merely shifting among cate-
gories. Kenneth Abraham and Lance Liebman developed this point al-
most twenty years ago in an article categorizing compensation systems 
into those based on fault, cause, and loss.91 Each type uses categorical 
restrictions to limit recoveries. In tort, a fault-based system, recovery re-
quires proof that a loss was caused by the defendant’s negligence. In no-
fault, a cause-based system, recovery depends on establishing that an 
injury was caused by an accident. In the federal Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI) system, compensation is based on loss, but claimants 
recover only if their losses qualify as a permanent disability that renders 
them unable to work.92 In each of these systems, the categorical limita-
tion could be regarded as “arbitrary”; in none of these cases, however, is 
the randomness factor large enough that one can intelligibly regard the 
limitation as equivalent to a lottery or anything remotely like it. 
                                                                                                                      
90 See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. For more on risk evaluation and cost-
benefit analyses, see generally Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philoso-
phical Perspectives (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001); Frank Ackerman 
& Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value 
of Nothing (2004); Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rational-
ity: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our 
Health (2008). 
91 Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort 
Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 Colum L. Rev. 75, 108–
09, 117 (1993). 
92 Disability Planner, U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., http://www.socialsecurity.gov/dibplan/ 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2010). SSDI provides benefits to individuals who have worked in jobs 
covered by Social Security and who suffer permanent disability that renders them unable 
to work. Abraham & Liebman, supra note 91, at 83–84; Disability Planner, supra. This is not a 
basic premise of a loss-based system; it is simply where SSDI draws the eligibility line. See 
Sugarman, supra note 3, at 168–90 (providing a more expansive loss-based social welfare 
approach). 
In addition, some systems are hybrids. See Gary T. Schwartz, Auto No-Fault and First-
Party Insurance: Advantages and Problems, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 611, 616--22 (2000). No-fault 
automobile insurance in New York, for example, provides exclusive no-fault insurance 
coverage for economic loss up to $50,000 resulting from an automobile accident and al-
lows victims who sustain more than $50,000 in economic loss or suffer serious injury to sue 
in tort for negligence, creating a system in which recovery may depend upon fault, cause, 
or loss, or some combination thereof. Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Reparations Act, N.Y. 
Ins. Law §§ 5102–1504 (McKinney 2009). 
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 These diverse categorical restrictions serve at least two essential 
purposes. First, they provide a way to ration limited public resources. 
Injury compensation competes for public resources with myriad other 
social goals. Government-sponsored systems like the New Zealand acci-
dent compensation scheme and SSDI employ such restrictions to de-
fine the scope of coverage and to compensate only certain types of 
losses—respectively, in these two systems, accidental injuries or perma-
nent disabilities—while excluding others. In tort, legal doctrines such 
as duty and proximate cause limit liability in order to avoid over-
deterring socially useful activity and to prevent a “flood” of litigation 
that would overwhelm courts’ own limited institutional resources and 
impose large social costs.93 The reality of limited resources—both in 
terms of funds to pay claims and institutions to adjudicate them— 
makes categorical restrictions on compensation a practical necessity. 
 Second, these restrictions help to build the political support 
needed to establish and maintain compensation systems.94 Insofar as 
workplace injuries, accidents, and permanent disability are problems of 
widespread concern, compensation systems that focus on these sources 
and types of injuries are more likely to attract political support. In a 
similar vein, politically salient losses and events—including adverse re-
actions to childhood vaccines, black lung disease, and the 9/11 terror-
ist attacks—have generated support for other narrowly-focused com-
pensation systems.95 
 These categorical restrictions inevitably generate concerns about 
arbitrariness. Abraham and Liebman develop the point in the context— 
far removed from tort—of SSDI eligibility determinations.96 Their analy-
sis suggests that SSDI eligibility determinations based on a binary yes-no 
test arbitrarily treat individuals with similar disabilities differently and 
that the subjective nature of the judgments required to make these 
determinations leads to unpredictable outcomes.97 Appreciating these 
                                                                                                                      
93 See Robert L. Rabin, The Pervasive Role of Uncertainty in Tort Law: Rights and Remedies, 
60 DePaul L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010). The term “flood” of litigation is another metaphor 
applied to tort litigation that is used in rhetorically strategic ways. See Marc Galanter, Read-
ing the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About Our 
Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 4, 65 (1983); Robert L. Rabin, 
Emotional Distress in Tort Law: Themes of Constraint, 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1197, 1198–
1202 (2009). 
94 Sugarman, supra note 3, at 103 (“Political considerations also play a role in deter-
mining which sorts of accidents are addressed by compensation schemes.”). 
95 For further discussion, see Robert L. Rabin, The Renaissance of Accident Law Plans Re-
visited, 64 Md. L. Rev. 699, 703–13 (2005). 
96 Abraham & Liebman, supra note 91, at 110. 
97 Id. Abraham and Liebman explain: 
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problems in the SSDI system illuminates why a critic of the tort system 
concerned about arbitrariness must do more than simply advocate no-
fault or social insurance alternatives as a solution. Instead, the tort skep-
tic must articulate baseline social welfare premises and then choose 
among various forms of arbitrariness by justifying why some are more 
objectionable than others and why proposed systemic reforms will strike 
a better balance. 
 For more than forty years, proponents of tort reform have fre-
quently invoked the lottery metaphor to emphasize the problem of ar-
bitrariness in the tort system and to urge that tort be replaced by no-
fault accident insurance and administrative risk regulation. We have 
argued that the metaphor is inapt because tort law, for all its flaws, is far 
from being a lottery-like system of random outcomes, and because the 
metaphor fails to recognize that arbitrariness is a characteristic feature 
of any compensation system that imposes categorical restrictions. As a 
consequence, shifting from tort to insurance cannot eliminate arbi-
trariness—although it may, in some respects and at some cost, reduce 
it. Reform must focus not on the existence of categorical restrictions in 
such systems, but on the form, content, justification, and number of 
these restrictions and the policy tradeoffs that they entail. At this point, 
at least one thing is certain: the lottery metaphor has obscured, rather 
than illuminated, thinking about tort reform, and it is time to retire it. 
                                                                                                                      
By imposing the requirement of total disability, SSD and most private disabil-
ity insurance programs do not provide compensation for partial disabilities—
those that prevent a person from engaging in a prior occupation but do not 
completely eliminate that person’s ability to work. This requirement makes 
eligibility a yes-no question, with a claimant being found completely ineligible 
or fully eligible. A substantial percentage of all applicants are near the bor-
derline of eligibility: something is wrong with them, perhaps they could work 
with difficulty or pain, and while it is reasonable for society to exempt them 
from further employment, others with similar difficulties continue to work. 
 The requirement of total disability is a major cause of the dissatisfaction 
with the outcomes of the vast adjudication system that labors to make SSD 
eligibility decisions. Because an individual’s application requires such a sub-
jective determination, and because so many of the cases are near the yes-no 
line, every student of the system concludes that outcomes depend on which 
decision maker sees a case, where in the country an application is filed, and 
what words a physician may have chosen to describe a condition. 
Abraham & Liebman, supra note 91, at 110. 
